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HUMAN-CENTERED AUTOMATION PHILOSOPHY
ATA National Plan, April 1989; pg. 5:
• The fundamental concern is the lack of a scientifically based philosophy of
automation which describes the circumstances under which tasks are
appropriately allocated to the machine and/or to the pilot.
- Humans will continue to manage and direct the NAS through 2010.
- Automation should be designed to assist and augment the capabilities of
the human managers.
- It is vitally important to develop human-centered automation for the
piloted cockpit and controller work station.
• NASA's Aviation Safety/Automation Program is founded in large part on these precepts.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRECEPTS IN THE NATIONAL PLAN
• An explicit philosophy of automation, and the explicit allocation of functions between
humans and machines in the system, are inextricable.
- Both must be approached as fundamental design Issues.
• By implication, automation can be designed to fulfill any task necessary for effective
system functioning.
- This is not true yet, but we believe it will be within a decade or so, perhaps
sooner.
• Despite this automation capability, humans are to continue to manage and control
the system, for a variety of social and political as well as technical (and probably
economic) reasons.
- Automation should therefore function to supplement, not to supplant, the
human management and control function in civil air transport.
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• Automation implementation to date has been largely technology-driven
highly capable
solid-state , [_
avionics
highly automated flight and
performance management
systems (B747-400)
highly reliable
redundant
distributed
microprocessors
D
automatic, reconfigurable
aircraft subsystem
management systems (MD-11)
highly sophisticated
fly-by-wire control
and guidance
systems
simplified flight control with
comprehensive envelope
protection (A-320)
• Do these systems, as implemented to date, supplement, or tend to
supplant, the flight crew as manager and controller of its aircraft?
• Do they perform the functions that a human-centered automation
philosophy would allocate to the machine, or to the human ?
• To answer these questions, we must be more explicit. What do we mean
by "human-centered automation"? Is it merely a catchy phrase, or a
concept that can be defined and evaluated rigorously?
• Because of the central importance of this question, we have given it
considerable attention from the genesis of the Aviation Safety/Automation
concept and program in 1987, though our work leading up to this program
has been in progress for nearly a decade.
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• What does the flight crew need to know?
• The answer depends on the automation philosophy embodied in the aircraft:
- Why is the flight crew informed?
- What are they expected to do about the information?
- Are they informed before, or after, action has been taken?
- Are they expected to diagnose the problem, choose a course of action,
concur with such a choice, carry out the action, or simply to be aware of
altered aircraft configuration or status?
° These and other similar questions about increasingly
competent and autonomous automated systems have led to a
search for a set of irreducible first principles for human-
centered aircraft automation.
• Our present construct is shown in the following viewgraph, in the
hope that we shall receive constructive criticism from the experts
at this workshop.
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HUMAN CENTERED AUTOMATION: FIRST PRINCIPLES
PREMISE:
AXIOM:
COROLLARIES:
The pilot bears the ultimate responsibility for the safety of
any flight operation.
The human operator must be in command.
The human operator must be _. To be involved,
the human operator must be "nL0.Lofrmed.
II
Because systems are fallible, and in order to remain informed,
The human operator must _ the system.
Because humans are likewise fallible,
The system should also monitor the human operator.
If monitoring is to be effective,
Each component must have knowledge of the other's
intent.
HUMAN-CENTERED AUTOMATION: APPLICATIONS OF
CONSTRUCT
Wrehave examined a number of mishaps and proposed systems in terms of this
construct:
• China Airlinesdescent into SFO
- Needed NP status information not immediately obvi0us
- Flight crew not sufficiently involved
- Was system effectively in command?
• Air Canada fuel exhaustion
- FMC system knew flight crew intent
- But aircraft was unable to inform crew of insufficient fuel
• A proposed system with automatic reconfiguration
- Should operator be informed of problem, or solution?
- Should operator be involved in decision to reconfigure?
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We have used this construct to evaluate a limited number of automated systems
in current aircraft.
• It points out certain known shortcomings in these systems, especially
with respect to information management
• It also suggests ways in which information transfer between humans and
systems might be improved
We are using this construct in the design of automated checklists for a series of
experiments which will begin this fall
• To determine whether the construct is viable
• To determine how it must be modified or extended to serve as the basis
for human-centered automation guidelines in our studies:
- automated procedures monitoring
- smart checklists
- automated diagnostics systems
SUMMARY
• Objectives of this Element of the Program
- Development of concepts and guidelines
- Evaluation of competing philosophies
- Integration of program elements in an intelligent, human-centered
automated cockpit
- Functional validation of these concepts and systems
• Cooperative research with industry in pursuit of these goals
• Hopefully, incorporation of validated concepts into automated interactive
cockpit design tools.
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WHY DOES THE 747-400 HAVE N/_',SA-DEVELOPED
WINGLET_ BUT NO NASA-DEVELOPED
TAKE-OFF MONITOR?
f ,., .._J::.<k.._
ORy WHY IS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER HARDER IN FLIGHT DECK
THAN IN AERO_ STRUCTURES_ AND PROPULSION
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
• Goal
• Who
• What
• How
Preconditions
Impediments
Solutions
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
GOAL
What is the most effective means for accomplishing
the transfer of the program's research products?
NASA
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM
PROGRAMS TO COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
SUPPLIERS
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ZO_AY_U_O 
• Transport Aircraft Manufacturers
• Business Aircraft Manufacturers
• Avionics Manufacturers
• Airlines
• Pilots
• Controllers
• FAA (Standards, Regulations)
• Research Comnmnily (Academic & Industrial
Standards)
• Military
• NTSB
A ND FROM WIIOM
WltArl ' (OUTI'UT)
Information (Tools, Measures)
Technology (Systems, Designs, Hardware)
• Methods - Measures
• Guidelines (Training, Operational Design)
• Candidate Designs (Early Protolypes)
• Technical Support
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A H
- Preconditions
- Impediments
- Solutions/Suggestions
I'RECONDITIONS/PROI'ER ENVIRONMENT
• Clear Goal Statement (Shared Goals)
• Economic Incentives
• Measurement Technology
• Ease of Interaction
• Stable Funding
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TECItNOLOGY TRANSFER
IMPEDAMENTS
• Poor Customer Interface
• Geography
• Iluma. Factors l)omain (Soft Scie.ce)
• NAS Incompatibility
• Type Rating Schenles
• Measurement Techniques
• Lack of Slandardization/Cross Feeding Simulation
Scenarios Methodology
• Foreign Competition
• Proprietory Rights
• Allocation of Resources
• Limited Market Place
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TECIINOLOGY TRANSFER
SOLUTIONS SUGGESTIONS
Living Program Plans
Workshops
Newsletters (Electronic, Multi-Media,
llyper-Media)
Networking Technologies - Support Structure
Temporary Personnel Exchanges
Cooperative Teams
Consortium Contracts (Novel Contracting)
Portability/Compatibility
• Methods and Scenarios
• t [ardwarc and Software
Demonslralions
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REALIZAT-IO_OF SUCCESS
1.
.
k _
User/Peer Review
• Demonstrations
• Simulations
Inclusion in Product Definitions
3. Citation Frequency
. Implementation
• FAA Certification
• Training
. ATC
• Aircraft Design
5. hnproved Aviation Safety and Efficielwy
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